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ABSTRACT 
No, we find no evidence for a return-enhancing role for corporate real estate 
holdings, which is consistent with the previous literature. Instead, our study based on 
a sample of U.S. listed corporations suggests that corporate real estate holdings are a 
form of managerial “empire building”. Corporations with weaker corporate 
governance and a lower degree of financial constraint tend to have higher real estate 
holdings, whereas higher real estate holdings are associated with lower returns to 
shareholders. The impact of corporate governance on corporate real estate holdings 
seems to be stronger in manufacturing-related industries. Implications and future 
research directions are discussed. 
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…But over time distributable income earnings that have been 
withheld by managers should earn their keep. If earnings have 
been unwisely retained, it is likely that managers, too, have been 
unwisely retained. 
 
Warren Buffett, The Essays of Warren Buffett. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not uncommon for corporate real estate decision to appear as headline news. For 
instance, on June 20th, 2007, the headline news of the Wall Street Journal reported that 
over the years, the Toyota U.S. has been expanding its building of factories in the U.S. as a 
way to enlarge employment of U.S. workers so as to win goodwill in the face of public 
rancor over the role of foreign automakers in the decline of the American auto industry. 1  
Building new factories has increased corporate real estate holdings, installed more factory 
management teams, and enhanced management visibility and status. In short, corporate real 
estate decisions could be directly linked to the over-expansion symptom of corporate 
management, a typical issue in corporate governance. 2 This paper attempt to take this view 
seriously and attempt to systematically examine the relationship between corporate real 
estate holdings and corporate governance             
In this paper, corporate real estate (CRE) refers to the land and buildings owned by 
companies that are not primarily engaged in the real estate business. Many companies 
choose to commit their scarce capital to owning real estate rather than re-deploying such 
capital to their core business. In the United States, it is estimated that corporate users own 
over $1 trillion worth of various property types, amounting to at least five times the value 
held by publicly traded real estate companies (Kim, 2004). Using US data, Tuzel (2005) 
found that on average property makes up 30% of a firm’s physical capital. In the United 
Kingdom, many of the largest non-real estate companies control property portfolios that are 
comparable in value terms with those owned by mainstream property companies (Tewson 
and Chinnock, 1992; Liow, 1995). 
Why do non-real estate firms prefer to buy CRE, which will clearly decrease the 
“liquidity” of the firms, rather than to rent them? 3 One possible and important reason is 
that there is a tax advantage. More generally, this class of explanations will predict that, 
other things being equal, higher corporate real estate holdings are associated with higher 
stock returns.  
                                                 
1 According to the article, the Toyota U.S. management has ignored the idle production capacity in the 
existing factories but built up more factories around the U.S. as a form of “political insurance.” Later, 
in view of the rising labor costs, idle production capacity, and unprofitable expansion of factory 
building, the Toyota headquarters has decided to stop new factory building in the United States. 
2 Though the scale of business is often intuitively related to the scale of real estate investment in the 
media so that the Toyota’s move was interpreted as slowing down its investment expansion in the U.S., 
it is not necessarily the case. In fact, there are economic arguments suggesting that firms with strong 
growth potential should rent rather than purchase real estate in order to preserve liquidity. 
3 See Wheaton (2005) for a discussion of the traditional views on why corporations may want to own 
rather than lease real estate. 
Another view is that for some industries, such as manufacturing, real estate ownership 
is necessary, of otherwise they cannot find from the market the optimal industrial real estate 
which is compatible with the special design of assembly lines they need. In other words, 
the demand for real estate holdings is driven by the production mode. Those firms which do 
not own their real properties may simply be constrained to do so. On the other hand, other 
sectors such as legal service or accounting service do not hold real properties because their 
production mode does not require specially designed real estate. Thus, the cross-firm 
variation in real estate holdings is driven by the difference in the nature and necessity of 
corporate demand for real estate. The exact composition of assets could vary from firm to 
firm. And since the composition of assets is determined optimally for each firm, the cross-
firm variation in real estate holdings should not bear any relationship with the cross-firm 
variation in equity returns or firm performance in general.  
Contrary to these two views, most empirical work shows that real estate holdings do 
not improve and often worsen the stock market performance of those ‘property-intensive’ 
non-real estate firms.4 (See Appendix 1a for a summary). It leaves the CRE holdings a 
commonly observed yet puzzling phenomenon.5  
We attempt to address this issue from a corporate finance perspective. According to 
Jensen (1986), if firms are left with free cash flow, the management has incentives to use 
the free cash in inefficient ways, i.e., investing in projects with negative net present value 
but high private benefits rather than repaying to investors as dividends. In countries with 
extremely weak legal institutions and corporate governance, managers could easily 
expropriate corporate earnings for their private benefits. Under some extreme 
circumstances, managers can divert corporate resources simply through outright theft.6   
However, in countries with fairly strong legal institutions and corporate governance 
systems, managers need to adopt a more circuitous and hidden approach to expropriating 
corporate earnings. Clearly, overinvestment in real estate could be one avenue for 
managerial expropriation. Managers can gain tremendous on-the-job consumption benefits 
from literally “empire-building” in the sense of over-purchasing, over-building and over-
holding a large number of plush office buildings and luxurious company apartments, and 
they can keep investors’ profits under their discretion and potentially gain various monetary 
                                                 
4 For instance, see Deng and Gyourko (1999), Seiler, Chatrath and Webb (2001), and Brounen and 
Eichholtz (2005). 
5 Another popular explanation is the holdup problem for firm-specific corporate real estate. We will get 
back to this point later. 
6 Among others, see La Porta et. al. (1998, 1999, 2002), Johnson et. al. (2000) for related discussion. 
and non-pecuniary benefits from the possible real estate price appreciation in the future. 
Interestingly, these investments in the real estate holdings are often made in the name of 
improving corporate image, improving all staff’s working (and even living) conditions, and 
corporate long-term expansion. In sum, real estate investment could be one excellent way 
for managers to extract corporate earnings for their own private benefits.  
In this paper, we first revisit the relationship between CRE holdings and corporate 
stock returns. Consistent with the earlier studies, we detect a strong negative relationship 
between real estate holdings and firm returns for our sample of US companies.7 After 
establishing the adverse impact of CRE holdings on corporate valuation, we move on to 
examine the empirical determinants of real estate holdings for our sample of US firms. In 
particular, we study the relationship between property holdings and various corporate 
governance measures, controlling for other factors (including financial constraint measures, 
growth potential, etc.). The US is selected for this research because it is widely agreed to 
have one of the most adequate legal institutions and corporate governance systems in 
practice. Thus, it provides us with a good setting to investigate whether CRE holdings have 
been used as one circuitous way for the management to pursue private benefits. We 
measure corporate governance strength mainly from the corporate ownership structure and 
management compensation scheme. Our findings confirm our hypothesis: other things 
being equal, both a higher extent of financial constraint and weaker corporate governance 
are associated with higher real estate holdings. More concretely, CEO ownership, 
management compensation structure and outsider ownership play an important role in 
determining real estate holdings in the US corporations. First, an increase of ownership by 
CEO or outside blockholders reduces the real estate holdings. Second, for the management 
compensation, we find that the higher the proportion of stock options to total compensation, 
the lower the real estate holdings. Third, we provide empirical evidence that the problem of 
duality, i.e., the position of chairman of the board of directors and that of chief executive 
officer are held by the same person, most probably increases real estate holdings. Finally, 
the results suggest that higher real estate holdings are associated with larger amounts of 
free cash flow but with lower growth opportunities. Our analysis helps identify one channel 
of how corporate governance affects corporate valuation: weak corporate governance leads 
to excessive real estate holdings by non-real-estate companies, which in turn brings down 
the firm value.     
                                                 
7 Recently, Dong et al (2012) study the corporate real estate holdings in China and examine whether 
CRE holdings are driven by some government policies among competing explanations. 
Clearly, this apparently un-orthodox view may bother some readers. For instance, 
some may worry that larger and more capital intensive firms may need more real estate in 
their production process. Our current regressions do include “size” as one of the control 
variables. In addition, the industry dummy variables can potentially control for capital 
intensity variation across industries.  The second worry is that the treatment of real estate 
depreciation may distort the measurement of real estate holding and therefore affect the 
accuracy of the results. While this point is well taken, we also want to mention a few points 
why this concern may not be as serious as it may seem. First, our sampling period is 
relatively short and ends before the “mark-to-the-market” practice in accounting gets 
popular. Second, we also have casual conversations with some accounting professionals 
and they tend to think that the differences in real estate depreciation treatment across firms 
are rather small, due to regulations and other considerations. Perhaps more importantly, we 
are more concerned of how the differences in real estate holdings across firms can be 
explained by the difference in corporate governance variables across firms. Thus, even if 
there are mis-measurements in the calculations of real estate holdings, as long as those mis-
measurements are uncorrelated to the explanatory variables, it would not affect our 
qualitative results. The third concern points to the fact that the ownership of real estate can 
lead to “easier finance” through the collateral effect. Our current regression formulation has 
already included the “long term debt” variable which would capture that effect. (From our 
conversations with market participants, the collateral position does not seem to matter as 
much for the short term financing). The fact that corporate governance variables seem to 
matter most in manufacturing firms, which seems to be a kind of industry effect, also 
bothers some researchers. Some may argue that because manufacturing firms do need 
specific investment in land and building for the production process, they would naturally 
have larger shares of real estate holdings in their assets. While this observation is true, the 
production-based argument may still need to explain why firms with “weaker corporate 
governance” within the same industry will hold even more properties than those that are 
“stronger” in corporate governance after controlling for a host of production-based and 
liquidity-based potential determinants of CRE holdings. We have more elaboration on these 
points in later sections.         
Perhaps more fundamentally, one may wonder why CRE investment is highlighted as 
a case study to verify the free cash flow theory as well as the importance of corporate 
governance in shaping corporate investment policy. After all, these points have been 
discussed extensively in the literature. In our view, studying the relationship between CRE 
and corporate governance can substantially improve our understanding of the importance of 
corporate governance in determining corporate investment policy. First, CRE investment 
usually involves a very significant amount of liquidity, which would imply a sacrifice of 
other investment opportunities. Given the fact that there is a well-developed rental market 
for commercial real estate in the USA, it is not clear why some corporations will insist on 
purchasing CRE. Second, the negative correlation between CRE holdings and stock 
performance has been repeatedly documented and yet firms still invest in CRE. This is a 
puzzle that has not been resolved. Third, recent research such as Jin et al (2012) suggest 
that the fluctuations of CRE value can impact the “borrowing capacity” of firms and hence 
CRE can play a role in the propagation of shocks over the business cycles. Perhaps more 
importantly, the relationship between corporate governance and CRE holdings seems to be 
under-explored.8 The closest one is Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), which studies the 
relationship between managerial incentive and investment in PPE (Plant, Property and 
Equipment). They examined the effects of CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility on firms’ investment strategy. They found that 
a higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity (the change in the dollar value of the executive’s 
wealth for a one percentage point change in stock price) provides a strong incentive to 
CEOs to decrease risky investment (R&D expenditure in their framework) and increase less 
risky investment (PPE investment in their framework). They also found that a higher 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility leads to riskier policy choices, including 
relatively more investment in R&D and less investment in PPE. This paper examines the 
corporate PPE investment from a completely different angle. They treat PPE as less risky 
investment, but we regard PPE or CRE investment as a channel for corporate managers to 
over-invest for the purpose of empire building. In particular, we examine the impact of a 
host of corporate governance aspects rather than the CEO pay-performance sensitivity on 
PPE investment. Moreover, we also allow for other factors, such as diversification, 
financial constraint, etc., to be empirical determinants of the PPE investment. In addition, 
we provide evidence that higher PPE investment is not associated with higher stock return. 
Thus, this paper should be considered as complementary to Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006).  
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 summarizes 
                                                 
8 After the circulation of the first draft, the authors become aware of Sing and Yin (2006). They study a 
similar problem in the context of firms listed on Singapore Stock Exchange. However, they combine 
the real estate firms, financial firms and other firms in their sample. All of their data are from the same 
year. In sum, they adopt a very different strategy from this paper.  
some findings of the CRE management literature. Section 3 explains the dataset and lays 
out the corporate governance measures to be employed. Other determinants of real estate 
holdings are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides evidence that higher CRE holdings 
are associated with lower stock returns. Section 6 investigates which are the empirical 
determinants of the CRE holdings. Section 7 looks at the role of corporate governance as 
well as other firm characteristics in determining the flow of real estate acquisitions or sales. 
Some further robustness tests are conducted in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.  
 
2. MISMANAGEMENT OF CORPORATE REAL ESTATE 
Before conducting formal econometric tests, we would like to summarize a 
relatively overlooked literature on real estate management. Despite the great value 
invested, CRE assets are found seriously under-managed and even mismanaged.  
Effective management of real estate, as in the case of other assets, requires the 
collection and maintenance of a database for sound decision making. However, 
according to a survey by Veale (1989), approximately 2/3 of the firms surveyed did 
not maintain any separate management information system for the ongoing 
management and control of real estate assets. Furthermore, when asked how the after-
tax return on real estate (net income plus appreciation) was compared with the 
company’s overall return, 60% of firms reported that real estate returns were not 
calculated. Most significantly, only 29% of the respondents reported that they have 
analyzed and prepared the information related to real estate management for top 
management to review on any scheduled basis (i.e., quarterly, semiannually, or 
annually). Approximately 47% prepared the information on an ‘as necessary’ basis 
only. Another 23% did not report at all. Gale and Case (1989) also found that less than 
half of the firms in the study (44%) had made any attempt to maintain current market 
value data on their real estate. Redman and Tanner (1991) find that many managers 
make their CRE purchasing decisions based on individual subjective measures rather 
than any analytical method. Apparently, surveys of corporate managers have revealed 
managers’ curious ignorance and lack of interest in relating their real property assets 
to the overall business strategies (Veale, 1989).  
On the other hand, the literature tends to support the view that leasing real estate 
is more favorable to shareholders’ interests. Nourse (1994) found that firms that lease 
tend to link their real estate strategy more closely to their overall corporate strategy. 
Veale (1989) found that while only 1/3 of firms surveyed did maintain a separate 
management information system for the ongoing management and control of their real 
estate, roughly 2/3 maintain information on lease dates and commitments, 
identification of surplus properties, utilization and current capacity of existing 
properties as well as for tracking square-foot costs by facility, and evaluating the 
physical condition and performance of buildings. Allen, Rutherford and Springer 
(1993) found that there are positive abnormal returns after the sales and leaseback 
announcement and suggested that real estate leasing decisions benefit corporate 
stockholders. 9 
In sum, the real estate management literature does not seem to support the value-
enhancing role of CRE holdings. This leads us to naturally conjecture an alternative 
hypothesis, namely, over-investment in real estate is a subtle approach for the 
management to expropriate corporate earnings. 
 
3. OUR DATASET AND CONVENTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS 
Our initial sample is the universe of all firms for which complete data are 
simultaneously available on the following databases: Compustat Industrial Annual 
that provides accounting data for firms, Compustat Executive Compensation that 
provides CEO-compensation-structure-related items, Blockholder Dataset that 
provides information related to blockholders, and Compustat Segment Dataset that 
provides the reported number of business segments. To minimize the endogeneity 
problem in analyzing the impact of corporate governance and corporate liquidity on 
CRE holdings, we focus on the CRE holdings in the year 1998, and the corporate 
governance, liquidity and other characteristics variables over the period 1995-97. 
First, we follow the common practices in the literature to exclude financial firms 
from the sample because they are subject to a different set of regulations, which may 
affect their corporate governance. We also exclude real estate development firms since 
our aim is to analyze the land and buildings owned by companies that are not 
primarily engaged in the real estate business. Firms with missing observations of any 
                                                 
9 One potential explanation that reconciles our argument with the findings of the better management of 
leased corporate real estate is that corporations having better corporate governance tend to lease rather 
than purchase and hold real estate. The better corporate management teams in corporations with better 
governance typically keep good record of those leased real estate.  
variable are also dropped. Consequently, we are left with 549 firms for our analysis. 
We name this sample as the 1998 sample because it is used for analyzing the CRE 
holdings in 1998. To establish the robustness of our results, we further trace those 
firms in the 1998 sample four years forward to build a new sample. With the same 
selection criteria, we find that 350 firms in the 1998 sample have explanatory 
variables available for the period 1999-2001 and CRE holdings available for 2002. 
We label this new sample as the 2002 sample.  
Now we turn to a description of the conventional factors which are important to 
CRE holdings, and how they are measured in the dataset we employ. They include the 
growth opportunities, size, the diversification of a firm’s business segments, level of 
debt, industrial effect and the impact of imperfect capital market. Appendix 1b 
provides a summary of the variables we will employ.  
3.1. GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
We hypothesize that firms with greater growth opportunities have more 
incentives to avoid cash shortage or financial distress. The demand for cash drives 
these firms to rent rather than to own, which results in a smaller proportion of real 
estate in their total asset portfolio. Following the literature, we employ the ratio of 
Market to Book value of equity (M/B) as a proxy for firms’ growth opportunity. A 
higher M/B ratio suggests that the market expects the corporations to have better 
future earnings. This could be indicative of better growth opportunities.  
For market to book value, we derive it by using fiscal year end stock price (data 
199) multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding (data 25) over total 
shareholders’ equity (data 216). 
3.2. SIZE 
Theory suggests that smaller firms have a greater propensity to lease than larger 
firms do if there are significant non-convexities or indivisibilities associated with the 
use of certain fixed assets. For example, smaller firms may not need an entire unit of 
building. Also, smaller firms tend to be younger and may face larger uncertainty over 
their future needs of capital investment. Thus, leasing could avoid incurring the 
transaction costs associated with resale. On the other hand, it is also suggested that 
owning is less costly than leasing for major companies due to large corporations’ 
ability to borrow at low rates (Whited, 1992; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). However, 
there is presently no empirical agreement whether the size effect on the proportion of 
real estate to total assets is positive or negative.10 In our study, we employ the natural 
logarithm of sales (data 12) as a proxy for a firm’s size.  
3.3. FIRM FOCUS 
A popular explanation for corporations to hold real estate is its use in 
diversifying the portfolio. The low correlations between real estate and other 
components in the portfolio suggest that real estate can play a significant role of risk 
diversification in mixed-asset portfolios.11 We expect that firms focusing on a small 
number of business lines may find holding real estate as a way to diversify their 
corporate risk. Thus, the number of business segments reported would be negatively 
related with the proportion of real estate in total assets. We use the number of reported 
business segments from the Compustat segment dataset as a measure of business 
focus.  
3.4. LEVEL OF DEBT 
Since the 1980s, debt has been suggested to act as a self-enforcing governance 
mechanism.12 The idea is that debt can force managers to generate cash or/and reduce 
the cash flow available for them in order to meet the obligations to repay interest and 
principal. Thus, it mitigates the potential agency costs of free cash flow. Thus, we 
expect to observe a negative correlation between CRE holdings and debt level. On the 
other hand, some scholars suggest that interest payments can be easily met, and hence 
doubt the usefulness of debt in mitigating the potential agency costs of free cash 
flow.13 In this view, no significant relationship is expected between CRE holdings and 
corporate leverage. In addition, since real estate can serve as collateral for borrowings, 
CRE holdings are expected to be positively associated with long term debt14. We 
employ the ratio of long term debt to total assets as a measure of level of debt to 
control for the effect of corporate leverage on CRE holdings.  
3.5 INDUSTRIAL EFFECT 
It is reasonable to conjecture that for different industries, the optimal proportion 
                                                 
10 For instance, Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) empirically found that the influence of firm size on owning 
is positive and significant. On the other hand, Redman and Tanner (1991) found that firms with assets 
valued less than $50 million are more likely to own real estate than larger firms. With UK data, Liow 
(1995) suggested that over the sample period, it appeared that size would not affect the owning/leasing 
decision. 
11 The literature is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see Quigley (2006) and the reference 
therein. 
12 For instance, Jensen (1986, 1993) call it the ‘control hypothesis’. 
13 Empirically, the results seem to be mixed. 
14 See Redman and Tanner (1991) and Liow (1995) 
of property, plant and equipment (PPE) in asset portfolio should be different.15 For 
instance, power plants, bridges and railways constitute a high share of the total assets 
for utility and transportation firms. On the other hand, the demand of the service 
sector for real estate may be much smaller. Hence, it is important to control for the 
industry differences in the study of CRE holdings. For our model, we will try to 
isolate the industrial effect by including industry dummies based on the one-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code16.  
3.6. IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKET  
It is well known that with perfect capital market, there would be no association 
between internally generated cash flows and the firm-level investment activities. In 
practice, the capital markets are imperfect.17 Thus, firms facing high costs of external 
finance arising from severe information asymmetry may find that leasing can 
economize on fixed capital costs. In the literature, it is generally agreed that firms that 
pay no cash dividends and generate low cash flow are likely to be among those 
suffering most from information asymmetry.  
3.6.1. Dividend payout 
Smith and Watts (1992) argued that dividends should be lowest for those firms 
with the greatest risk of facing the underinvestment problem. As a result, firms with 
low or no cash dividend payout may prefer to lease rather than own PPE in order to 
economize on the cost of funding. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) found that the total 
lease share of a firm that pays no cash dividends is about 25% higher than that of a 
dividend-paying firm. Hence, from the perspective of liquidity constraint, we expect 
that firms with no cash dividend payout will hold a smaller proportion of real estate to 
their total assets.  
Alternatively, dividend policies very likely reflect corporate governance structure. 
According to La Porta et al. (2000), weak corporate governance leads to a firm’s 
smaller willingness to pay out cash dividends; the firm may well misuse the retained 
earnings to purchase rather than rent real estate. In this sense, we anticipate that firms 
with no cash dividend payout will keep a larger proportion of their assets in real estate.     
                                                 
15 For instance, see Redman and Tanner (1991), Brounen and Eichholtz (2005). 
16 According to the SIC code, firms can be generally classified into 7 categories. They are 1, Mining; 2, 
Construction; 3, Manufacturing; 4, Services; 5, Trade; 6, Transportation, Communication and Utility; 7, 
Other. 
17 For instance, see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Myers (2003), Stein (2003) and the 
reference therein. 
To test which view is more relevant, we include a dummy variable which is 
equal to one for non-dividend-paying firms and zero otherwise in our analysis.  
3.6.2. Cash flow 
Prior studies have repeatedly documented a positive relation between investment 
expenditure and cash flow. For instance, Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) found that the 
share of total annual fixed capital costs attributable to leases is substantially higher in 
cash-poor firms. Krishnan and Moyer (1994) found that firms with lower operating 
earnings are more likely to lease, suggesting the existence of financial constraint at 
the corporate level. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) showed that investment is 
constrained by current cash flow for U.S. manufacturing firms in the Value line 
database. Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that if there was asymmetric information, 
firms would prefer internal funds (i.e., cash flow) to external finance that is 
information sensitive. Recent studies such as Brav et al. (2005), Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2005) suggest that managers have strong incentive to maintain the dividend 
at some “target ratio”. What would they do if they have some “windfall cash”? 
Investing in real estate can be one possibility. Riddick and Whited (2007) show that 
when a positive productivity shock causes both cash flow and the marginal product of 
capital to rise, firms will dissave and invest cash in capital goods including real estate 
assets that have become more productive, leading to a negative correlation between 
savings and cash flow. Thus, we expect that firms with more cash flow will invest 
more in real estate.  
On the other hand, cash flow can be “in excess”. Jensen (1986) suggested that if 
firms were left with too much cash flow, the management has incentives to use the 
cash flow in inefficient ways. Recently, researchers have found that firms with low 
growth opportunity and high cash flow tend to ‘waste’ cash flow in ways such as 
acquisitions (Lang, Stulz, and Walking, 1991; Hanson, 1992; Born and Mcwilliams, 
1993; Doukas, 1995). Opler et al. (2001) found that companies with excess cash 
(measured using balance sheet cash information) have higher capital expenditure and 
spend more on acquisitions, even when they appear to have poor investment 
opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s Q).  
To empirically test these competing theories, we measure cash flow by operating 
income before depreciation (data13) minus interest expenses (data15), taxes (data16), 
preferred dividends (data19), and common dividends (data21). To eliminate any size 
effect, we normalize this measure by the book value of assets (data6)18. 
 
4. MEASURING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Clearly, the literature on corporate governance is too large to be reviewed here. Due to 
the limit of space, we can only afford to provide a summary of some of the literature in 
Appendix 2. This section only briefly describes how different measures of corporate 
governance could be related to CRE holdings.   
4.1. THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MEASURES ON OVER-INVESTMENT IN PPE 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that the separation of ownership and 
control gives managers the chance to waste corporate resources and cash flow on 
excess perquisites and negative-net-present-value projects at the expense of 
shareholders. This view is largely verified by recent empirical studies such as La 
Porta et al. (1999, 2000, 2002) and Brav et al. (2005). Therefore, on top of the 
conventional determinants of CRE holdings, we would consider whether weaker 
corporate governance is associated with more CRE holdings. If such a relationship is 
established, our hypothesis that over-investment in real estate being an avenue for 
management to waste the cash flow will earn a ground. Following the corporate 
finance literature 19 , we will consider several general categories of governance 
measures including CEO ownership, outside blockholder ownership, CEO 
compensation sensitivity, board composition and the problem of duality, all of which 
will be explained in more detail in the following. 
4.2. MANAGEMENT OWNERSHIP 
There is a large body of literature supporting the notion that managerial 
ownership of company stock shares can help align the interests of managers with 
those of shareholders, that is, agency cost will be reduced.20 Thus, with increased 
managerial ownership, managers are less likely to divert resources away from firm 
value maximization as they bear part of the costs of their actions. Therefore, one 
would expect a negative relationship between managerial ownership and real estate 
holdings. In our empirical test, we adopt CEO ownership as a proxy for management 
ownership. Data on CEO ownership are collected from the Compustat Industrial 
Annual and Compustat Executive Compensation datasets. 
                                                 
18 We follow Lehn and Poulson (1989), Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) on this. 
19 See Survey by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gillan (2006) 
20 Among others, see Mcconnel and Servaes (1990), Mehran (1995), Singh and Davidson (2003). 
4.3. OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER OWNERSHIP 
Due to the well-known free rider problem, no shareholder owning minority 
shares is willing to monitor the managers. It is because shareholders bear all the costs 
of their monitoring activities while benefit from monitoring only in proportion to their 
shareholdings (Grossman and Hart, 1988). On the other hand, blockholders, having 
claims to a large fraction of the firm’s return, have much stronger incentives to 
monitor managers. Consequently, managerial discretion is restricted to some extent 
and agency costs between managers and shareholders will be reduced (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). In addition, an outside blockholder has arguably a different set of 
incentives than does a shareholder who is CEO of the firm. There are many studies 
supporting the view that the outsider ownership is positively related to corporate 
governance quality (Weisbach, 1988; Mehran, 1995; North, 2001). The Compustat 
Blockholder dataset provides information on the ownership of outside blockholders, 
which is the sum of percentage of equity held by individual investors, institutional 
investors, and corporations who own at least 5% of the common stock of the company. 
We choose 5% (as many researchers do) because this ownership level triggers 
mandatory public filing under SEC regulation.  
4.4. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION STRUCTURE 
The use of equity-based compensation in the form of stock and options has 
become increasingly popular in recent years (Murphy, 1999). Structure of executive 
compensation can be used to effectively align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders. Previous research suggests that tightly linking managers’ compensation 
to firm performance motivates them to make more value-maximizing decisions (e.g. 
Holmstrom, 1979; Harris and Raviv, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983). For instance, 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a) suggested that equity-based rather than cash 
compensation gives managers the correct incentive to maximize firm value. Jensen 
and Murphy (1990b) also find a statistically significant relationship between level of 
pay (measured by changes in executive wealth) and performance (measured by 
changes in value). Mehran (1995) found that firm performance is positively related to 
the percentage of executive compensation that is equity-based. Hall and Liebman 
(1998) suggested that a large amount of a CEO’s incentives to increase stock price is 
generated from the movement of his options’ value instead of by flow compensation. 
Datta, Datta and Raman (2001), by studying executive compensation and corporate 
acquisition decisions, found that executive stock option grants provide effective and 
strong motivation for managers to make value-maximizing investments decisions. In 
this sense, we expect that more equity or option-based CEO compensation strengthens 
corporate governance and reduces CRE holdings.   
On the other hand, some studies examine the CEO compensation structure from 
a different perspective. They suggest that the use of equity compensation will expose 
managers to more risk. It is because their level of remuneration is highly dependent 
on firms’ performance. As a result, the risk-averse managers will choose to forgo 
some positive-net–present-value projects if those projects are very risky. Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) empirically suggested that a higher CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity provides a strong incentive to CEOs to decrease risky investments (R&D 
expenditure in their framework) and increase less risky investment (PPE investment 
in their framework). Thus, under this view, more equity or option-based CEO 
compensation increases CRE holdings.   
We follow the previous practice21 in constructing the proxy for the proportion of 
equity-based compensation in CEO’s total compensation.22 Specifically, we employ 
the ratio of Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black-Scholes) to total 
compensation which comprises the following items: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, 
Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using 
Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total as a proxy of 
CEO’s total compensation that is equity-based. These kinds of compensation-related 
information are from Compustat Execomp dataset. 
4.5. BOARD COMPOSITION 
There is a growing body of evidence that outside directors (those who do not 
work for the company) are more independent of top management and thus better 
represent the interests of shareholders than do inside directors. Jensen (1993) argues 
that outside directors have an incentive to act as effective monitors of management 
because they want to protect their reputation as independent and effective decision 
makers. There are many empirical studies on board composition and agency cost 
(Weisbach, 1988; Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Chen 
et. al., 2006). Overall, empirical findings generally support the argument that outside 
directors are important and effective for monitoring management and thus reducing 
                                                 
21 Mehran (1995), Datta et. al (2001) 
22 We choose CEO’s total compensation only but not other high ranking executives because of the 
limitations on data availability. Moreover, Core and Larcker (2002) suggest that non-CEO executives 
generally hold a substantially smaller amount of equity in their compensation than the CEO does. 
agency cost. In the current context, we will test whether the real estate holdings  
affected by the corporate board composition, which is measured by the ratio of the 
number of outsider directors (neither current nor past officers) relative to the total 
number of directors. Data on board composition are collected from companies’ proxy 
statements and/or annual reports.  
4.6. DUALITY 
Jensen (1993) argued that the CEO should not have a dual position as chairman 
of the board because the CEO may not separate personal interests from shareholder 
interests. The issue of CEO duality has aroused considerable attention because such 
practice is frequently observed in many large firms and it seems to exert a negative 
effect on the firm’s performance (Kesner, Victor, & Lamont, 1986; Baliga et al., 1996; 
Simpson and Gleason, 1999). In our study, we include a dummy variable taking value 
one if the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. We 
aim at examining whether the problem of duality will exacerbate the problem of 
overinvestment in CRE.  
 
5. CORPORATE REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS AND FIRM RETURNS: A 
REVISIT  
In this section, we want to investigate the relationship between CRE and firm 
returns by following the methodology of the existing literature such as Deng and 
Gyourko (2000). This is a crucial step. As it will be clear, higher CRE holdings are 
not associated with higher returns to corporate shares. It leads the analysis naturally to 
other explanations of CRE holdings, which will be examined in the following sections. 
The analysis here mainly consists of two stages. The first stage follows the Fama-
Macbeth approach to estimate Jensen’s alpha. The regression model is specified as 
ERETit = αi + βi EMKT t + εit 
where the dependent variable, ERETit, is the weekly excess return on the stock of firm 
i in period t. It is calculated as the difference between the company’s weekly holding 
period return and the weekly T-bill return. The weekly T-bill return is derived from 
the 30-day T-bill return. EMKTt is the weekly excess return on the market portfolio 
which is measured as the difference between the weekly return on the CRSP value-
weighted market portfolio and the weekly T-bill return. Slope coefficient βi measures 
the sensitivity of firm return to the systematic risk. Constant term αi is the 
idiosyncratic component of the monthly excess return. Error term εit follows the 
standard normal distribution. From this regression model, we can obtain the fitted 
values of αi and βi. In the statistical analysis, for the sake of robustness check, we 
estimate this model for several different periods: we use weekly stock return data to 
estimate this model for the periods 1995-1998, 1998-2002, and 1995-2002 
respectively. Accordingly, we obtain fitted values of αi based on these three different 
periods. 
In the second stage, we examine the relationship between CRE holdings and the 
non-systematic or idiosyncratic component of firm returns αi. Table 1 displays the 
various regression specifications. The dependent variable is Jensen’s alpha for each 
firm. The central independent variable is the ratio of PPE to total assets. We control 
for industry dummies, firm size (the logarithm of sales), and the β estimates. The 
regression results are quite strong and consistent: companies with higher CRE 
holdings tend to have lower excess stock returns.   
(Table 1 about here) 
For robustness check, we vary the measure of CRE holdings. We generate a 
dummy variable that takes value one if the firm’s PPE/total assets ratio is above the 
sample median. This variable indicates high concentration of real estate holdings. It 
also exhibits consistently negative and significant impacts on firm returns in various 
regressions. We also construct a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm’s beta 
is below 0.9 which is roughly the average beta for commercial real estate companies 
in the US (Deng and Gyourko, 2000). The principal result remains unchanged. 
This exercise helps us verify an intriguing phenomenon in Corporate America: 
concentration of CRE holdings is associated with lower returns to shareholders; real 
estate holdings cast negative effects on corporate value. It is then natural to ask why 
there exists such a negative relationship between the two, and why the shareholders 
would allow the managers to “over-accumulate” CRE in the first place. In the 
following we attempt to shed light on this question from the perspective of corporate 
governance.           
 
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS 
The previous section suggested that CRE holdings may not be good news for 
shareholders. It begs the question of why CRE is purchased in the first place. There 
are many possibilities and this section attempts to shed light on this issue. Specifically, 
we estimate a cross-sectional econometric model using the three-year average value 
of each of the firm characteristics (except corporate governance related variables).23 
For the 1998 sample, we measure real estate holdings (the dependent variable) in 
1998 and the explanatory variables over the “previous period”, 1995-1997. Using past 
values also lowers the probability of reverse causality, i.e., the observed relations 
reflect the effects of real estate holdings on firm-specific factors 24 . Corporate 
governance variables (such as CEO ownership, CEO compensation structure, outside 
blockholder ownership and characteristics of board structure of firms) are also 
measured in a year prior to 1998, i.e., they take the value of year 1995. Empirical 
studies suggest that corporate-governance-related variables are rather stable over a 
certain period of time (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Barclay and Holderness, 1989; 
Denis and Sarin, 1999). We repeat the same analysis in the 1998 sample for the 2002 
sample by employing the same econometric structure. (Please refer to Table 2 for 
comparison.) 
(Table 2 about here) 
6.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The summary statistics in Table 3 present an overview of the sample 
characteristics of real estate holdings and corporate governance variables. The mean 
PPE ratio of the 1998 sample is 0.38 and the median is 0.32. The figures decrease to 
0.34 and 0.28 in the 2002 sample respectively. The average CEO ownership for the 
1998 sample is 2.2% and the median is 0.26%. For the 2002 sample, the 
corresponding figures are 2% and 0.27%. In the 1998 sample, there are 71.7% of 
firms with CEO ownership less than 1%; 88.9% of firms have CEO ownership less 
than 5%. In the 2002 sample, the corresponding figures are 72.9% and 90.3% 
respectively. Moreover, there are 69% and 80% of firms in the 1998 and 2002 samples 
respectively that contain outside blockholders. The median value of the outside 
blockholders’ ownership is 18.9% for the 1998 sample while the figure increases to 
19.9% in the 2002 sample. The median is 17.26% for the 1998 sample and 18.3% in 
the 2002 sample.  
(Table 3 about here) 
                                                 
23 Following Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), we do this to mitigate problems that might arise due to short-
term fluctuations or extreme values in any particular year. 
24 See Rajan and Zingales (1995), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), for similar methodology. 
In terms of CEO compensation structure, the mean and median of the ratio of 
stock option value to total compensation are 25.9% and 20.4% respectively for the 
1998 sample. The corresponding figures for the 2002 sample are 37.5% and 37.6%. 
Our figures are very close to those found by Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2002), who 
report an average ratio of 30.3% during the period 1993-98. On average, boards of 
firms comprise 10.4 directors in the 1998 sample and 10.2 directors in the 2002 
sample, while the median is 10 directors in both the 1998 and the 2002 samples. The 
average proportion of outsiders in the board is 0.73 while the median is 0.75 in the 
1998 sample. In the 2002 sample, the average increases slightly to 0.77, while the 
median also increases to 0.8. That is, for an average firm in the 1998 sample, the 
number of directors who are current or past executive officers is 2.8, whereas the 
number of directors who are not current or past executive officers is 7.6. The 
corresponding figures for the 2002 sample are 2.5 and 7.7 respectively. For the 
problem of duality, there are 26.4% of firms and 25.6% firms in the 1998 sample and 
2002 sample respectively where the positions of CEO and COB are held by different 
people.  
6.2. REGRESSION RESULTS 
In Table 4, we report the regression results for the model that includes the 
conventional and corporate governance determinants of CRE holdings. The 
conventional determinants include cash flow, firm size, market-to-book ratio, number 
of business segments, no dividend dummy, and long-term debt. The corporate 
governance variables include CEO ownership, CEO compensation sensitivity, 
ownership by outside blockholders and two variables related to board characteristics, 
namely (OUTSIDER/DIR) which gives the fraction of executive directors on board of 
directors, and a dummy variable (CEO_COB) that takes a value of one if the firm’s 
CEO and chairman of the board are the same individual. 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
In general, the estimated coefficients deliver the predicted signs. The results are 
consistent with the theory that under imperfect capital markets, firms facing high 
costs of external finance find that leasing can economize on fixed capital costs. Two 
proxy variables for external financing costs display expected results. Cash flow exerts 
a significantly positive impact on CRE holdings. 25 The estimated coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level in both the 1998 and the 2002 samples. In addition, the 
coefficients for the ‘no dividend’ dummy are negative and significant at the 1% level 
in both periods. The result supports that firms with no dividend payout (which may be 
more cash-constrained) hold less property in their asset portfolios. 
Similarly, consistent with the theoretical prediction, firms with better growth 
opportunity (measured by a higher market to book value ratio) invest a relatively 
smaller amount on real estate. In both the 1998 and the 2002 samples, the relationship 
between growth opportunities and real estate holdings is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. In addition, the estimated coefficients of the number of segments are 
negative in sign and significant at the 10% level in the 1998 sample and the 1% level 
in the 2002 sample. It lends support to the argument that the advantage of corporate 
asset diversification by holding real estate is relatively minor for well-diversified 
firms that run many lines of business. On the other hand, we fail to find any evidence 
to support the view that larger firms have a higher propensity to own properties. The 
estimated coefficients for Size are insignificant in both periods. The coefficient of 
Leverage (long term debt/total assets) is positive and significant in both samples. This 
may be because firms holding excessive real estate come with a large amount of 
mortgage loans (Redman and Tanner, 1991; Liow, 1995).  Our findings on the 
relationship between long-term debt and CRE are consistent with those of previous 
empirical work. 
Next, we turn to the perhaps more important issue, i.e., how corporate 
governance affects CRE holdings in U.S. corporations. We detect evidence showing 
that corporate governance strength is negatively related to CRE holdings. The 
coefficient of CEO ownership is negative and significant at the 10% level in the 2002 
sample and negative but insignificant for the 1998 sample. It suggests that the level of 
CEO ownership may exert an influence on CRE holding decisions of US firms. This 
is consistent with the view that a better alignment of the interests of CEOs and 
shareholders can mitigate the problem of over-investment in real estate.   
The coefficients of ownership by outside blockholders are negative and 
significant at the 1% level and 15% level in the 1998 and 2002 samples respectively. 
The result corroborates the view that outside block shareholders contributing to 
                                                 
25 For instance, Redman and Tanner (1991) found that 62.8% of correspondents of their survey 
employed cash flow from operation as the method of real estate financing. 
monitor corporate management. Since outside blockholders are not involved in daily 
operation of the firm, they can rarely generate private benefits from firm’s decision, 
and thus will not support inefficient investment. This finding confirms that 
governance structure affects firms’ decision on CRE holdings.  
We cannot find any significant relation between board composition and CRE 
holdings in both the 1998 and 2002 samples. This may arise from the fact that the 
variation in the proportion of outsiders in the board in our sample is too small. In our 
sample, only around 5% of the firms have boards of directors in which current and 
past executive officers account for more than half of the board. In more than 75% of 
our sample firms, outsiders compose more than 2/3 of their board.26  
The dummy variable for duality, i.e., the same individual holds the position of 
chief executive officer and the chairman of the board, is significant at the 15% level 
with a positive sign in the 1998 sample. The positive sign is exhibited in the 2002 
sample but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. The results can be 
interpreted as follows: when a corporation concentrates management power and board 
power in an individual, it would probably lower the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Thus, it is easier for the management under such ‘loose’ 
control mechanisms to waste cash flow by over-investing in negative-net-present-
value projects such as purchasing real estate properties. The coefficients of CEO 
compensation incentive are negative but insignificant in both samples. 
Overall, we find that some of the corporate governance indicators widely used in 
the literature display statistically significant and negative impacts on CRE holdings, 
suggesting that a higher level of CRE investment and holdings is likely to be a 
consequence of weaker corporate governance.    
 
7. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHANGES AND INCREMENT IN REAL ESTATE 
HOLDINGS  
 
So far, our study has focused on the cross-sectional analysis for the stock of real 
estate holdings in year 1998 and year 2002 separately. A natural question to ask is whether 
real estate holdings will change significantly once corporate governance and other firm 
characteristics have changed. To put it differently, what determines the flow of real estate 
                                                 
26 Another possibility is that some of the “outside directors” are not “outside enough.” We, however, do 
not have a better measure of this. 
acquisition or sales? We conjecture that the changes in corporate governance structure, 
liquidity constraint and other firm characteristics may induce companies to purchase or sell 
a substantial amount of properties. Because the changes in real estate holdings may well be 
caused by some natural variation in real estate stock value such as depreciation, we pay 
particular attention to how the changes in firm characteristics affect the likelihood of 
incurring substantial changes in real estate holdings. The rationale for this analysis lies in 
that a large degree of changes in real estate holdings is more likely to be caused by 
significant changes in corporate policies on real estate investments rather than by natural 
adjustment of real estate holdings.  
To verify this conjecture, we first match the companies in the 1998 sample with those 
in the 2002 sample, and obtain 322 firms that are covered in both samples with complete 
data. We then calculate the change in real estate holdings, i.e., the difference in the ratio of 
PPE/Total Assets, over the four years. The majority of sample companies (around 63%) 
experience a decline in real estate holdings in the period 1998-2002. About 20% of the 
sample companies witness an increase of more than 4.6% in the ratio of PPE/Total Assets; 
and about 10% of the sample firms register an increment of over 5.1% in this real estate 
holding ratio. Based on the distribution characteristics of the increment in real estate 
holdings for our sample firms, we define a dummy variable for large increment in real 
estate holdings based on three alternative criteria: positive change (>0), more than 4.6% 
positive change, and more than 5.1% positive change. The dummy variable takes value one 
if the four-year growth in real estate holdings is larger than 0, 4.6%, and 5.1% respectively. 
To look at how the changes in firm characteristics affect those in CRE holdings, we 
generate explanatory variables reflecting the changes in cash flow, company size, market to 
book ratio, number of business segments, corporate leverage (long-term debt), CEO 
ownership, CEO compensation structure, outside blockholder ownership, board 
composition and duality of the positions of CEO and chairman of the board.27          
Table 5 presents the logistic regressions where the dependent variable (dummy 
variable corresponding to a large increment in CRE holdings) is regressed on a host of 
explanatory variables. We see that an increase in cash flow leads to a lower level of real 
estate holdings in some regression. Other things being equal, an increase in firm size 
actually causes the ratio of CRE holdings to decline. Perhaps as the firm size increases, the 
                                                 
27 We also examine the effects of changes in dividend issuance status on the changes in real estate 
holdings. However, dividend issuance status does not have enough time-series and cross-section 
variation so that it is often dropped from regressions.   
firm tends to have more than one establishment but it may not commit to purchasing all the 
operation sites. Hence the ratio of renting would actually increase. The changes in the 
market-to-book ratio, long-term debt and the number of business segments produce no 
significant impact on the increment in real estate holdings.  
(Table 5 about here) 
In terms of corporate governance measures, an increase in the CEO ownership share 
reduces the probability of incurring a large increment in CRE holdings, and the effect is 
statistically significant when the dependent variable is a positive change in real estate 
holdings. Similarly, a change from the CEO-board chairman duality to no duality, a signal 
of improvement in corporate governance, decreases the likelihood of the firm experiencing 
a large increment in corporate property. These results are consistent with our claim that 
better corporate governance leads to lower chances of increasing CRE holdings. Other 
corporate governance indicators are mostly insignificant. Change in board composition (i.e., 
increases in the proportion of outside directors on the board) even shows positive and 
significant effects in one regression.  
One may object that using differences in the dependent and independent variables to 
measure changes may suffer some bias due to the existence of scale effects. To correct this 
potential issue, we use the four-year growth rate in the dependent and independent 
variables to measure increment. For instance, the growth rate of CRE holdings for firm i is 
calculated as (PPE/Total Assets for year 2002 – PPE/Total Assets for year 1998)/(PPE/Total 
Assets for year 1998). Corresponding to the above-mentioned case of using difference in 
the variables, about 63% of sample companies have a decrease in real estate holdings in the 
period 1998-2002. Around 20% of the sample companies register a growth rate of more 
than 10% in property holdings; and about 10% of the sample firms record a growth rate of 
over 20% in real estate holdings. Therefore, we define a dummy variable for a large growth 
in real estate holdings based on three alternative criteria: positive change (>0), more than 
10% positive growth, and more than 20% positive growth. The dummy variable takes value 
one if the four-year growth in real estate holdings is larger than 0, 10%, and 20% 
respectively.  
Table 6 presents the logistic regressions based on the growth rates in property 
holdings, corporate governance, financial constraint and other control variables.28 Because 
these variables have some observations taking value zero, the calculation of four-year 
                                                 
28 The dummy variables of changes in duality are constructed as before. 
growth rates leads to a smaller sample size of 161 firms. The results in table 6 are 
consistent with those of table 5.  An increase in cash flow leads to a higher level of real 
estate holdings in some regression. An increase in firm size actually causes the real estate 
holdings to decline. The growth rates in the market-to-book ratio and the number of 
business segments produce no significant impact on the increment in real estate holdings.  
 (Table 6 about here) 
Corporate governance measures produce some significant results. An increase in the 
CEO ownership share reduces the probability of incurring a large increment in CRE 
holdings. Its estimated coefficient is statistically significant when the dependent variable is 
more than 10% and 20% growth in real estate holdings. Similarly, an increase of the equity-
based option value in CEO compensation reduces the likelihood of having a large 
increment in CRE holdings. Its estimated coefficients are significant when the dependent 
variable is positive or more than 10% positive changes in real estate holdings. There is also 
some evidence that a change from the CEO-chairman duality to no duality reduces the 
likelihood of having more than 20% growth in real estate holdings. These results are 
consistent with our claim that better corporate governance lead to lower chances of 
increasing CRE holdings. Other corporate governance measures are mostly insignificant. 
Change in board composition even shows positive and significant effects in one regression.  
In sum, our analysis in this section provides some further evidence on how improved 
corporate governance depresses CRE holdings. 29 
 
8. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
8.1. FULL SAMPLE SPLITTING 
As we mentioned in the previous section, the ‘optimal’ level of CRE holdings 
across industries should be different based on their industries’ specific needs. 
Researchers suggest that CRE ratio exhibits very large variations across industries 
(Redman and Tanner, 1991; Nourse and Roulac, 1993; Brounen and Eichholtz, 2005). 
Our main objective in this section is to check whether the factors that are shown to be 
significant in determining CRE in the full sample behave the same way for industries 
                                                 
29 Taking into consideration the possibility that corporate governance variables might show relatively 
small variations over a short period of time, we also tried to conduct regressions with variant 
specifications. For instance, the explanatory variables include the changes in accounting variables and 
the levels of the corporate governance variables taking the value of the initial year (1998). The results 
are reported in Appendix 3. The corporate governance variables produce much less statistically 
significant estimated coefficients.   
with different nature. We will split the full sample into two sub-samples based on the 
nature of different industries. One sub-sample includes the Mineral sector, 
Construction sector and Manufacturing sector (MCM). The other sub-sample includes 
the Trade sector, Services sector and Others (TSO)30. Clearly, the production process 
of the MCM sectors often requires specific physical assets, e.g. factory and 
production lines. On the other hand, for firms engaged in the services and trade 
sectors, their need for specific physical assets is lower. Tables 7 and 8 provide a 
description of the summary statistics. 
(Table 7 and 8 about here) 
8.2 REGRESSION RESULTS 
In Table 9, we report the regression results for the ‘MCM’ and ‘TSO’ sub-
samples 31 . Firms with low cash flow, no dividend payout and good growth 
opportunities tend to hold a small amount of CRE in their asset portfolio no matter 
they are from the ‘MCM’ sector or ‘TSO’ sector. Moreover, whether in the ‘MCM’ or 
‘TSO’ sector, the CRE holdings appear to be associated with long-term debt ratio. In 
addition, firms in the ‘TSO’ sector hold a smaller amount of CRE if their businesses 
are well-diversified by operating in several business lines. On the other hand, such 
pattern cannot be observed in the ‘MCM’ sector.  
(Table 9 about here) 
For corporate governance measures, CEO ownership tends to play a more 
important role in mitigating the problem of over-investment in CRE in the ‘MCM’ 
sector. Such a role is performed by outside blockholders in the ‘TSO’ sector. For the 
‘MCM’ sector, we can also observe a significantly negative impact of CEO 
compensation incentive and outsider blockholder ownership on real estate holdings in 
the 2002 sample and the 1998 sample respectively. In addition, a significantly positive 
coefficient for the duality dummy (CEO=chairman) can be observed in the 1998 
sample in the ‘MCM’ sector.  
In sum, we find that the negative relationship between corporate governance 
strength and CRE holdings is much stronger in the ‘MCM’ sector. Why is it the case? 
A popular explanation is the “holdup” problem for firm-specific real estate. In 
                                                 
30 The reason for excluding the sector of Transportation, Communication and Utility will be explained 
in appendix. 
31 We included Mineral sector Dummy and Construction sector Dummy in ‘MCM’, Trade Sector 
Dummy and others sector dummy in ‘TSO’. 
principle, real estate firms could build and own firm-specific real estate and then rent 
them to the production firms. However, it would lead to a “holdup” problem in ex post 
terms. After the real estate is built, since it is firm-specific, it can only be rent out to 
other firms with a significant discount. The “inside value” is now higher than the 
“outside value”. In that case, the production firm can threaten to terminate the rental 
contract unless the real estate firm lowers the rent. The real estate firm can anticipate 
this ex post holdup problem and hence will be unwilling to build firm-specific real 
estate. Therefore, at the equilibrium, firm-specific real estate would be built and sold 
to the production firms.32 The corporate governance perspective, however, further 
elaborates the issue. Since it is much more justifiable for those firms in the ‘MCM’ 
sector to purchase rather than rent real estate, and those properties tend to be firm-
specific, the management has even more excuses to over-invest. The asset-specificity 
makes it harder for the shareholders to judge whether the investment is well grounded. 
There may be no enough “outside reference” to compare. In that situation, the 
corporate governance schemes in monitoring management become more critical, 
which explains why we obtain the result that other things being equal, the corporate 
governance variables are shown to be more important determinants of CRE holdings 
in the ‘MCM’ than in the ‘TSO’ sector.  
 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It has long been advised that management needs to be monitored, or their 
investment decisions may not maximize the interests of the shareholders. The 
previous literature tends to focus on investment projects which are directly related to 
production, such as the amount of physical capital investments. This paper suggests 
that the same kind of intuition also applies to Corporate Real Estate holdings, which 
are a kind of capital investment less directly related to the production process. Our 
results confirm the previous studies that asset return in the stock market is negatively 
associated with real estate holdings, which are in turn influenced by financial 
constraint variables (such as whether firms distribute dividends) and growth variables. 
On top of that, we find that the corporate governance variables are also important, 
especially in industries where plant and property are “necessary”. In particular, the 
devices which discipline the management for other kinds of “excessive spending”, 
                                                 
32 For more formal discussion on the optimal contract under potential hold-up problem, see Hart (1995), 
among others. 
such as increasing the CEO ownership, increasing the percentage of stock option in 
the total managerial compensation, etc., also contribute to reducing the CRE holdings. 
Our results derived from sample splitting and logit regression further support the view 
that firms with good corporate governance tend to rent real estate, and have better 
performance in the stock market, and that over- investment in CRE could be an 
avenue for management to expropriate firms’ resources.  
Future research should therefore address the following questions. First, if “weak 
corporate governance” is associated with more CRE holdings, how would those 
holdings interact with the executive compensation? Second, is there any self-selection 
about which kind of corporate governance mechanism to adopt? Third, how would the 
dynamics of the market structure be affected if more corporations choose to rent 
rather than own real estate? Fourth, would the globalization in production and 
consumption promote or discourage corporate real estate holdings? Some ongoing 
projects are now being pursued along these directions. 
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Table 1: Cross sectional data regression of Alpha vs. PPE(net)/TA-Full Sample 
 Alpha98 Alpha02 Alpha full Alpha98 Alpha02 Alpha full 
PPE/Total -0.0014 b -0.0013 a -0.00092 b -0.0014 b -0.0013 a -0.00094 b
Assets (0.00070) (0.00048) (0.00037) (0.00070) (0.00048) (0.00037) 
       
Log of Sales 0.000073 -0.000053 -0.000022 0.000069 -0.000063 -0.000032 
 (0.000098) (0.000063) (0.000052) (0.000098) (0.000064) (0.000052) 
       
Beta    0.00029 0.0012 b -0.00076 a
    (0.00029) (0.00049) (0.00016) 
# of obs. 549 549 549 549 549 549 
Adjusted R2 0.0078 0.073 0.071 0.0080 0.059 0.047 
 
Notes: Industry specific fixed effects are estimated for all models, but they are not reported. 
Superscripts a, b, c, and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels 
respectively.  
 
 Alpha98 Alpha02 Alpha full Alpha98 Alpha02 Alpha full 
PPE/Total -0.0014 b -0.0013 a -0.00094 b  
Assets (0.00070) (0.00048) (0.00037)    
       
PPE/Total   -0.00059 b -0.00049 a -0.00033 b
Assets>50%    (0.00027) (0.00018) (0.00015) 
       
Log of Sales 0.000069 -0.000063 -0.000032 0.000081 -0.000053 -0.000025
 (0.000098) (0.000064) (0.000052) (0.000097) (0.000064) (0.000052) 
       
Beta<0.9 0.00029 -0.0011 a -0.00076 a 0.00028 -0.0010 a -0.00077 a
 (0.00029) (0.00022) (0.00016) (0.00029) (0.00022) (0.00017) 
# of obs. 549 549 549 549 549 549 
Adjusted R2 0.0080 0.059 0.047 0.0082 0.056 0.045 
 
Notes: PPE/Total Assets>50% is a dummy variable that takes value one if the ratio PPE/Total assets for 
a company is above sample median and zero otherwise. Beta<0.9 is a dummy variable that takes value 
one if the beta of a company is below 0.9, which is roughly the average level of beta in commercial real 
estate industry, and takes value zero if otherwise. Industry specific fixed effects are estimated for all 
models, but they are not reported. Superscripts a, b, c, and d indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively.  
Table 2: Comparison of 1998 sample and 2002 sample 
 
  1998  
sample 
2002 
sample 
Dependent variable 1998 2002 
Financing variables Average of 1995-1997 Average of  
1999 to 2001 
Corporate Governance 
variables 
1995 1999 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics-Full sample 
 
Summary statistics for variables explaining 1998PPE/TA 
Remarks: Number in ( ) is the summary statistics for variables explaining 2002 PPE/TA 
 
 Mean S.D. Max Min 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
PPE/TA 
 
0.375 
(0.337) 
0.222 
(0.220) 
0.933 
(0.946) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.197 
(0.166) 
0.324 
(0.283) 
0.548 
(0.485) 
Free Cash 
Flow 
0.093 
(0.086) 
0.054 
(0.053) 
0.287 
(0.288) 
-0.323 
(-0.160) 
0.058 
(0.054) 
0.090 
(0.083) 
0.124 
(0.113) 
M/B 3.339 
(4.100) 
3.210 
(5.981) 
35.214 
(69.681) 
0.371 
(0.164) 
1.767 
(1.469) 
2.512 
(2.327) 
3.757 
(4.229) 
Business 
segments  
2.02 
(3.31) 
1.40 
(1.94) 
10 
(10) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(3) 
3 
(4) 
Sales 
($MM) 
4776 
(5802) 
9434 
(11045) 
105481 
(121275) 
6.727 
(101.9) 
714 
(867) 
1626 
(2035) 
4658 
(5797) 
Ln Sales 7.549 
(7.761) 
1.329 
(1.303) 
11.57 
(11.71) 
1.906 
(4.624) 
6.571 
(6.765) 
7.394 
(7.618) 
8.446 
(8.665) 
LT DEBT 
 
0.195 
(0.221) 
0.124 
(0.139) 
0.630 
(0.664) 
0 
(0) 
0.097 
(0.126) 
0.192 
(0.228) 
0.284 
(0.311) 
CEO OWN 
(%) 
2.19 
(1.98) 
5.62 
(5.23) 
53.6 
(39.6) 
0 
(0) 
0.080 
(0.084) 
0.258 
(0.266) 
 
1.216 
(1.002) 
CEO 
COMP 
0.259 
(0.375) 
0.251 
(0.281) 
0.964 
(0.999) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0.129) 
0.204 
(0.376) 
0.419 
(0.578) 
OUTBLK 
OWN (%) 
18.9 
(19.9) 
11.5 
(12.2) 
65.4 
(79.5) 
5 
(5) 
10.4 
(10.6) 
17.26 
(18.3) 
25.2 
(26.5) 
Board 
Composit 
-ion 
 
0.727 
(0.771) 
0.159 
(0.117) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
0.667 
(0.714) 
0.75 
(0.8) 
0.833 
(0.846) 
 
PPE/TA is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total asset, both in net book value. Cash flow is 
operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends 
and common dividend scaled by total assets. Size is natural log of sales. M/B is market value to book 
value. Business segment is the number of segments reported by compustat segment dataset. LT DEBT 
is long term debt scaled by total assets. No dividend dummy equal to 1 if the firm paid no dividend in 
year 1997(2001) and is 0 otherwise. CEO OWN is the percentage of share owned by Chief Executive 
Officer. CEO COMP is the proportion of compensation that is equity based( please refer variables 
description for detail construction). OUTBLK OWN is the percentage of share owned by outside 
blockholder. Board Composition is the proportion of outsider in the board of directors. CEO_CHR is a 
dummy variable which equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is also he chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. 
Number in ( ) is Robust Standard Error. ‘*’ represent the figure on number of segments and No 
dividend are from year 1997(2001) for 1998(2002) year of PPE(net)/TA. ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’ indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
  
Table 4: Cross sectional data regression of PPE(net)/TA-Full Sample 
 
   Expect sign 
Year of PPE(net)/TA 1998 2002  
Year of independent 
variables 
Average of 95-97* Average of 99-01*  
Year of Corp gov 
variables 
1995 1999  
Sample size 549 350  
M/B -0.011 a 
(0.003) 
-0.004 a 
(0.001) 
- 
Size -0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
? 
Business Segments -0.009 c 
(0.005) 
-0.014 a 
(0.005) 
- 
LT DEBT 0.525 a 
(0.074) 
0.390 a 
(0.071) 
? 
Cash flow 1.045 a 
(0.211) 
0.769 a 
(0.166) 
+ 
No dividend -0.089 a 
(0.018) 
-0.067 a 
(0.021) 
- 
CEO OWN -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.003 c 
(0.002) 
- 
OUTBLK OWN -0.002 a 
(0.001) 
-0.001 d 
(0.001) 
- 
CEO COMP -0.018 
(0.033) 
-0.029 
(0.034) 
- 
Board Composition 0.028 
(0.051) 
0.001 
(0.086) 
- 
CEO_CHR 0.024 d 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.020) 
+ 
R-sq. 0.461 0.489  
The dependent variable is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total asset, both in net book 
value. Dependent variables are cash flow, size, M/B, Business segments, LT DEBT, No dividend, CEO 
OWN, CEO COMP, OUTBLK OWN, Board Composition and CEO_CHR. Cash flow is operating 
income before depreciation minus the sum of interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends and common 
dividend scaled by total assets. Size is natural log of sales. M/B is market value to book value. Business 
segment is the number of segments reported by compustat segment dataset. LT DEBT is long term debt 
scaled by total assets. No dividend dummy equal to 1 if the firm paid no dividend in year 1997(2001) 
and is 0 otherwise. CEO OWN is the percentage of share owned by Chief Executive Officer. CEO 
COMP is the proportion of compensation that is equity based (please refer variables description for 
detail construction). OUTBLK OWN is the percentage of share owned by outside blockholder. Board 
Composition is the proportion of outsider in the board of directors. CEO_CHR is a dummy variable 
which equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is also he chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. Number in ( ) is 
Robust Standard Error. ‘*’ represent the figure on number of segments and No dividend are from year 
1997(2001) for 1998(2002) year of PPE(net)/TA. ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’ indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
Table 5: Logistic Model Regressions of the Change in PPE(net)/TA on 
the Changes in Liquidity and Corporate Governance Variables - Full 
Sample 
 
Years of PPE(net)/TA 
change 
1998-2002 1998-2002 1998-2002 
Dependent Variable Dummy =1 if change>0 Dummy =1 if change > 
4.6% (about 20% of firms) 
Dummy=1 if 
change > 5.1% (about 
10% of firms) 
Sample size 322 322 322 
Change in M/B 0.00634  
(0.0317) 
0.0483 
(0.0342) 
0.0158 
(0.0382) 
Change in Size -0.557 d 
(0.375) 
-0.157 
(0.407) 
-0.977 c 
(0.548) 
Change in Business 
Segments 
-0.0753 
(0.0872) 
0.151 
(0.113) 
-0.121 
(0.134) 
Change in LT DEBT -0.104  
(1.339) 
0.320 
(1.457) 
0.598 
(2.181) 
Change in Cash flow -1.0634   
(2.908) 
-5.730 c
(3.183) 
0.679 
(3.887) 
Change in CEO OWN -0.0805 c
(0.0437) 
-0.0385 
(0.0344) 
-0.0560 
(0.0402) 
Change in OUTBLK 
OWN 
0.0141 
(0.00986) 
0.00096  
(0.011) 
0.00020 
(0.0134) 
Change in CEO COMP 0.219  
(0.443) 
0.520  
(0.541) 
0.135 
(0.717) 
Change in Board 
Composition 
1.468 c 
(0.782) 
0.763 
(0.855) 
-0.992 
(0.953) 
Change in Duality (from 
no to yes) 
-0.483 
(0.361) 
-0.151 
(0.403) 
-0.624 
(0.583) 
Change in Duality (from 
yes to no) 
-0.607 d 
(0.391) 
-0.852 c 
(0.501) 
-0.903 d 
(0.593) 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -201.863 -155.94 -113.744 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0434 0.0372 0.0431 
The dependent variable is dummy variables indicating changes in corporate real estate holdings 
meeting certain criteria, that is, changes in the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total asset, both 
in net book value, are larger than 0, 4.6% and 5.1% respectively. Independent variables are four-year 
differences in cash flow, size, M/B, business segments, long-term debt, CEO ownership, equity-based 
CEO compensation, outside blockholder ownership, board composition and CEO_chairman duality. 
Cash flow is operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest expenses, taxes, preferred 
dividends and common dividend scaled by total assets. Size is natural log of sales. M/B is market value 
to book value. Business segment is the number of segments reported by compustat segment dataset. 
Long-term Debt is long term debt scaled by total assets. CEO ownership is the percentage of share 
owned by Chief Executive Officer. CEO COMP is the proportion of compensation that is equity based 
(please refer variables description for detail construction). OUTBLK OWN is the percentage of share 
owned by outside blockholder. Board Composition is the proportion of outsider in the board of 
directors. CEO_CHR is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is also he chairman 
of the board, 0 otherwise. Number in ( ) is Robust Standard Error. ‘*’ represent the figure on number of 
segments and No dividend are from year 1997(2001) for 1998(2002) year of PPE(net)/TA. ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ 
and ‘d’ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
Table 6: Logistic Model Regressions of the Growth Rate in PPE(net)/TA 
on the Growth Rates in Liquidity and Corporate Governance Variables --- 
Full Sample 
Years of PPE(net)/TA 
change 
1998-2002 1998-2002 1998-2002 
Dependent Variable Dummy =1 if growth 
rate>0 
Dummy =1 if growth rate 
> 10% 
Dummy=1 if growth 
rate > 20% 
Sample size 161 161 161 
Growth in M/B -0.308  
(0.425) 
-0.0547 
(0.203) 
-0.535 
(0.515) 
Growth in Size -3.892 
(2.965) 
-9.468 b 
(4.323) 
-15.571 a 
(5.141) 
Growth in Business 
Segments 
0.0573 
(0.137) 
-0.0173 
(0.0631) 
0.0132 
(0.265) 
Growth in LT DEBT 0.0196  
(0.0367) 
0.0172 
(0.0631) 
0.0809 b
(0.0327) 
Growth in Cash flow 0.189 
(0.221) 
0.0739 a
(0.0265) 
-0.0100 
(0.0234) 
Growth in CEO OWN -0.00202 
(0.0291) 
-0.431 a 
(0.157) 
-0.476 c  
(0.268) 
Growth in OUTBLK 
OWN 
0.174 
(0.120) 
0.0911  
(0.155) 
0.174 
(0.197) 
Growth in CEO COMP -0.186 c 
(0.107) 
-0.310 b 
(0.149) 
-0.265 d 
(0.183) 
Change in Board 
Composition 
0.00309 
(0.167) 
0.647 b
(0.277) 
-0.0189 
(0.125) 
Change in Duality (from 
no to yes) 
-0.552 
(0.487) 
-0.701 
(0.774) 
-1.749 
(1.393) 
Change in Duality (from 
yes to no) 
-0.145 
(0.538) 
-0.268 
(0.757) 
-2.317 d 
(1.463) 
Log Pseudo Likelihood -102.038 -71.565 -40.593 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0531 0.151 0.221 
 
The dependent variable is dummy variables indicating growth rates in corporate real estate holdings 
meeting the stated criteria, that is, growth rates in the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total 
asset, both in net book value, are larger than 0, 10% and 20% respectively. Independent variables are 
four-year growth rates in cash flow, size, M/B, business segments, long-term debt, CEO ownership, 
equity-based CEO compensation, outside blockholder ownership, board composition and 
CEO_chairman duality. Cash flow is operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest 
expenses, taxes, preferred dividends and common dividend scaled by total assets. Size is natural log of 
sales. M/B is market value to book value. Business segment is the number of segments reported by 
compustat segment dataset. Long-term Debt is long term debt scaled by total assets. CEO ownership is 
the percentage of share owned by Chief Executive Officer. CEO COMP is the proportion of 
compensation that is equity based (please refer variables description for detail construction). OUTBLK 
OWN is the percentage of share owned by outside blockholder. Board Composition is the proportion of 
outsider in the board of directors. CEO_CHR is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if the CEO of the 
firm is also he chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. Number in ( ) is Robust Standard Error. ‘*’ represent 
the figure on number of segments and No dividend are from year 1997(2001) for 1998(2002) year of 
PPE(net)/TA. ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 7: Summary statistics- Mineral, Construction and Manufacturing 
 
Summary statistics for variables explaining 1998PPE/TA 
Remarks: Number in ( ) is the summary statistics for variables explaining 2002 PPE/TA 
 
 Mean S.D. Max Min 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
PPE/TA 
 
0.338 
(0.301) 
0.186 
(0.189) 
0.933 
(0.946) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.196 
(0.164) 
0.305 
(0.267) 
0.427 
(0.366) 
LT DEBT 
 
0.72 
(0.210) 
0.114 
(0.131) 
0.630 
(0.634) 
0 
(0) 
0.085 
(0.110) 
0.161 
(0.208) 
0.253 
(0.301) 
Free Cash 
Flow 
0.101 
(0.090) 
0.055 
(0.051) 
0.287 
(0.282) 
-0.323 
(-0.159) 
0.070 
(0.064) 
0.098 
(0.088) 
0.128 
(0.115) 
M/B 
 
3.676 
(4.267) 
3.658 
(5.374) 
35.214 
(40.559) 
0.371 
(0.164) 
2.036 
(1.588) 
2.722 
(2.485) 
4.105 
(4.350) 
Business 
segments  
2.06 
(3.42) 
1.36 
(1.77) 
8 
(10) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(2) 
2 
(3) 
3 
(4) 
Sales 
($MM) 
4323 
(5036) 
7432 
(7849) 
64765 
(55743) 
6.7 
(102) 
700 
(842) 
1603 
(1820) 
4171 
(5410) 
Ln Sales 7.486 
(7.672) 
1.333 
(1.298) 
11.08 
(10.93) 
1.906 
(4.624) 
6.551 
(6.735) 
7.380 
(7.506) 
8.336 
(8.596) 
CEO 
OWN 
(%) 
2.227 
(1.823) 
5.677 
(4.777) 
53.6 
(37.1) 
0 
(0) 
0.101 
(0.084) 
0.291 
(0.259) 
 
1.360 
(0.939) 
CEO 
COMP 
0.272 
(0.400) 
0.242 
(0.269) 
0.964 
(0.985) 
0 
(0) 
0.047 
(0.206) 
0.227 
(0.394) 
0.442 
(0.591) 
OUTBLK 
OWN (%) 
20.1 
(19.4) 
11.5 
(12.6) 
64.2 
(79.5) 
5 
(5) 
11.3 
(10) 
17. 
(16.83) 
27.0 
(25.8) 
Board 
Composit-
ion 
0.723 
(0.766) 
0.166 
(0.120) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
0.667 
(0.714) 
0.75 
(0.8) 
0.833 
(0.833) 
 
PPE/TA is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total asset, both in net book value. Cash flow is 
operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends 
and common dividend scaled by total assets. Size is natural log of sales. M/B is market value to book 
value. Business segment is the number of segments reported by compustat segment dataset. LT DEBT 
is long term debt scaled by total assets. No dividend dummy equal to 1 if the firm paid no dividend in 
year 1997(2001) and is 0 otherwise. CEO OWN is the percentage of share owned by Chief Executive 
Officer. CEO COMP is the proportion of compensation that is equity based( please refer variables 
description for detail construction). OUTBLK OWN is the percentage of share owned by outside 
blockholder. Board Composition is the proportion of outsider in the board of directors. CEO_CHR is a 
dummy variable which equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is also he chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. 
Number in ( ) is Robust Standard Error. ‘*’ represent the figure on number of segments and No 
dividend are from year 1997(2001) for 1998(2002) year of PPE(net)/TA. ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’ indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
Table 8: Summary statistics-Trade, Services and other 
 
Summary statistics for variables explaining 1998PPE/TA 
Remarks: Number in ( ) is the summary statistics for variables explaining 2002 PPE/TA 
 
 Mean S.D. Max Min 25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
PPE/TA 
 
0.318 
(0.317) 
0.243 
(0.248) 
0.917 
(0.932) 
0.017 
(0.022) 
0.127 
(0.111) 
0.239 
(0.263) 
0.469 
(0.463) 
LT DEBT 
 
0.195 
(0.218) 
0.136 
(0.163) 
0.529 
(0.664) 
0 
(0) 
0.073 
(0.080) 
0.192 
(0.211) 
0.270 
(0.314) 
Free Cash 
Flow 
0.089 
(0.090) 
0.052 
(0.060) 
0.258 
(0.288) 
-0.020 
(-0.069) 
0.052 
(0.050) 
0.084 
(0.082) 
0.115 
(0.118) 
M/B 
 
3.250 
(4.702) 
2.395 
(8.264) 
13.174 
(69.681) 
0.488 
(0.223) 
1.923 
(1.408) 
2.531 
(2.377) 
3.774 
(5.420) 
Business 
segments  
1.680 
(2.759) 
1.350 
(2.139) 
10 
(10) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(2) 
2 
(4) 
Sales 
($MM) 
6345 
(8948) 
14183 
(18030) 
105481 
(121275) 
207 
(320) 
711 
(1198) 
1799 
(2503) 
6346 
(8630) 
Ln Sales 7.717 
(8.099) 
1.358 
(1.347) 
11.57 
(11.71) 
5.333 
(5.767) 
6.567 
(7.088) 
7.495 
(7.825) 
8.755 
(9.062) 
CEO OWN 
(%) 
2.963 
(3.058) 
6.348 
(6.981) 
43.872 
(39.604) 
0 
(0.002) 
0.124 
(0.120) 
0.459 
(0.456) 
 
2.014 
(1.363) 
CEO 
COMP 
0.286 
(0.347) 
0.284 
(0.323) 
0.948 
(0.999) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0.218 
(0.323) 
0.464 
(0.598) 
OUTBLK 
OWN (%) 
18.3 
(21.1) 
11.6 
(11.3) 
65.4 
(59.6) 
5 
(5.1) 
10.5 
(13.1) 
16.8 
(19.8) 
22.6 
(26.6) 
Board 
Composit 
-ion 
0.695 
(0.761) 
0.149 
(0.122) 
0.929 
(0.952) 
0.1 
(0.375) 
0.615 
(0.696) 
0.714 
(0.778) 
0.786 
(0.866) 
 
PPE/TA is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total asset, both in net book value. Cash flow is 
operating income before depreciation minus the sum of interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends 
and common dividend scaled by total assets. Size is natural log of sales. M/B is market value to book 
value. Business segment is the number of segments reported by compustat segment dataset. LT DEBT 
is long term debt scaled by total assets. No dividend dummy equal to 1 if the firm paid no dividend in 
year 1997(2001) and is 0 otherwise. CEO OWN is the percentage of share owned by Chief Executive 
Officer. CEO COMP is the proportion of compensation that is equity based( please refer variables 
description for detail construction). OUTBLK OWN is the percentage of share owned by outside 
blockholder. Board Composition is the proportion of outsider in the board of directors. CEO_CHR is a 
dummy variable which equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is also he chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. 
Number in ( ) is Robust Standard Error. ‘*’ represent the figure on number of segments and No 
dividend are from year 1997(2001) for 1998(2002) year of PPE(net)/TA. ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’ indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
Table 9: Regression of PPE(net)/TA-Split into ‘MCM’ and ‘TSO’ 
 
 Mineral- 
construction- 
Manufacturing 
 
Trade- 
Services, Other 
Year of PPE(net)/TA 98 02 98 02 
Year of independent 
variables 
Average of 95-97* Average of 99-01* Average of 95-97* Average of 99-01* 
Year of Corp gov 
variables 
1995 1999 1995 1999 
Sample size 351 230 122 83 
M/B 
 
-0.007 a 
(0.002) 
-0.003 b 
(0.001) 
-0.036 a 
(0.014) 
-0.011 a 
(0.002) 
Size 
 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
Business Segments 
 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.040 a 
(0.012) 
-0.060 a 
(0.010) 
LT DEBT 
 
0.413 a 
(0.080) 
0.355 a 
(0.078) 
0.689 a 
(0.148) 
0.662 a 
(0.134) 
Cash flow 
 
0.831 a 
(0.222) 
0.498 a 
(0.172) 
2.213 a 
(0.571) 
2.086 a 
(0.411) 
No dividend 
 
-0.087 a 
(0.021) 
-0.062 a 
(0.023) 
-0.077 b 
(0.038) 
-0.062 
(0.047) 
CEO OWN 
 
-0.002 c 
(0.001) 
-0.004 c 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
OUTBLK OWN -0.001 b 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004 b 
(0.002) 
-0.007 a 
(0.002) 
CEO COMP 
 
-0.016 
(0.038) 
-0.068 c 
(0.040) 
-0.037 
(0.067) 
0.018 
(0.060) 
Board Composition 0.003 
(0.061) 
-0.119 
(0.086) 
0.026 
(0.119) 
0.344 
(0.177) 
CEO_CHR 
 
0.037 b 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.022) 
0.014 
(0.037) 
0.017 
(0.050) 
R-sq. 0.336 0.478 0.420 0.566 
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total asset, both in net book 
value. Dependent variables are cash flow, size, M/B, Business segments, LT DEBT, No dividend, CEO 
OWN, CEO COMP, OUTBLK OWN, Board Composition and CEO_CHR. Cash flow is operating 
income before depreciation minus the sum of interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends and common 
dividend scaled by total assets. Size is natural log of sales. M/B is market value to book value. Business 
segment is the number of segments reported by compustat segment dataset. LT DEBT is long term debt 
scaled by total assets. No dividend dummy equals 1 if the firm paid no dividend in year 1997(2001) 
and is 0 otherwise. CEO OWN is the percentage of share owned by Chief Executive Officer. CEO 
COMP is the proportion of compensation that is equity based( please refer to variables description for 
detail construction). OUTBLK OWN is the percentage of share owned by outside blockholder. Board 
Composition is the proportion of outsider in the board of directors. CEO_CHR is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is also he chairman of the board, and is 0 otherwise. Number 
in ( ) is Robust Standard Error. ‘*’ represents the figure on number of segments and No dividend are 
from year 1997(2001) for 1998(2002) year of PPE(net)/TA. ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’ indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
Appendix 1a 
Previous literature on the Relationship between Real estate concentration ratio with Raw Return, Risk, Systematic Risk and Abnormal Return 
 
 Deng and Gyourko (1999) Seiler, Chatrath and Webb (2001) Liow (2004) Brounen and Eichholtz (2005) 
Sample period 
 
1984-93 1985-1994 1997-2001 1992-2000 
Raw Return N.A N.A positive : 
46.7% 
negative : 
53.3% 
Negative 
( exception: Electronics industry ) 
Risk 
( standard deviation of return)   
N.A N.A Positive N.A 
Systematic Risk ( Beta ) N.A Insignificant Positive and significant Insignificant 
( only significant in the high 
yielding industries like 
Communications and business 
Services ) 
Abnormal Return ( Jensen index ) Negative 
(Only forfirms with high real estate 
concentration and high beta risk) 
2 out of 9 sub samples: Positive 
7 out of 9 sub samples: Negative 
overall: insignificant 
Negative 
 
N.A 
Appendix 1b 
Variables description: 
 
Variables’ name Variables’ definition Data code in 
Compustat 
year 
Dependent variable    
PPE/TA 
 
PPE(net)/TA Data8/ data 6 1998 (2002) 
Firm Characteristics:    
LT DEBT 
 
Long term debt/Total 
asset 
 
Data 9/Data 6 Average of 1995-1997 
(1999-2001) 
Cash Flow Operating income 
before depreciation 
minus interest 
expense , taxes, 
preferred dividends 
and common dividends 
divided  by book value 
of Total assets 
(Data 13-Data 15-Data 
16- Data Data 19- Data 
21) / Data 6 
Average of 1995-1997 
(1999-2001) 
No Dividend Dummy variable 
which equal to 1 if the 
firm paid no dividend 
in year 1997(2001) , 
and is 0 otherwise. 
NA 1997 (2001) 
M/B Market to book value 
 
(Data 199 * Data 25)/ 
Data 216 
Average of 1995-1997 
(1999-2001) 
Ln Sales($MM) 
 
Ln Sales($MM) 
 
Ln Data 12 Average of 1995-1997 
(1999-2001) 
Business segments number of reported 
business segments 
 
NA 1997 (2001) 
Corporate 
governance 
variables : 
   
CEO OWN 
(%) 
 
Share owned by Chief 
Executive officer 
NA 1995 (1999) 
OUTBLK OWN 
(%) 
Share owned by 
outside blockholder 
NA 1995 (1999) 
Board Composition Number of outsider in 
the board of directors 
( neither current nor 
past officer ) divided 
by  total number of 
director inside the 
board 
NA 1995 (1999) 
CEO COMP 
 
Total Value of Stock 
Options Granted 
(using Black-Scholes) 
divided by total 
compensation which is 
comprised of  Salary, 
Bonus, Other Annual, 
Total Value of 
Restricted Stock 
Granted, Total Value of 
Stock Options Granted 
(using Black-Scholes), 
Long-Term Incentive 
Payouts, and All Other 
Total 
 
 
NA 1995 (1999) 
CEO_CHR Dummy variable 
which equal to 1 if the 
CEO of the firm is also 
the chairman of the 
board, 0 otherwise. 
 
NA 1995 (1999) 
  1
Appendix 2 
A selective summary of Corporate Governance 
Quality of Corporate Governance measures Management Ownership 
 
 Sample period Sample size Relationship between 
the variable and 
corporate governance 
quality 
Significance origin remark 
Morch, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) 
1980 371 (+) 0% to 5% 
(-) 5% to 25% 
(+) > 25% 
Yes U.S  
Short and Keasey 
(1999) 
1988-1992 225 <12% (+) 
>12% and <42% (-) 
>42% (+) 
Yes U.K Firms quoted on the 
Offical list of the 
London stock 
Exchange 
 
Mehran (1995) 1979-1980 153 (+) Yes 
 
U.S Manufacturing firms 
Hermalin and 
Weisbech (1991) 
1971, 1974, 1977,1980 
1983 
142 Tobin’Q 
(+) 0-1%, (-)1-5% 
(+)5-20%, (-) >20% 
0-1%: Yes 
1-5%: Yes 
5-20%:Yes 
>20%:Yes 
 
U.S NYSE firms 
  2
Singh and Davidson 
(2003) 
1992 and 1994 1528 proxies by 
(1)Asset turnover:(+) 
(2)SG&A expensive:(-) 
 
Asset turnover: Yes 
SG&A expensive: 
No 
U.S NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ listed large 
US corporation having 
sales revenue of 
$100M or more 
Mcconnel and Servaes 
(1990) 
1976 and 1986 1173 (yr1976) 
1093 ( yr1986) 
(+) until 40-50% 
(-) afterward 
Yes U.S  
Holderness, Kroszner 
and Sheehan (1999) 
1935 and 1995 651 (yr1935) 
1464 (yr1995) 
1995 data 
0-5%: (+) 
>5% and <25%: (+) 
>25% (+) 
0-5%: No 
>5% and <25%: No 
>25%: Yes 
U.S.  
Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) 
1984-1999 839 (+) < 20% 
(-) >24% and <64% 
(+) >64% 
Yes U.K Use cash holding as 
proxy of  Corporate 
Governance 
Measure ( cash holding 
inversely related to 
agency cost ) 
 
 
 
 
  3
Structure of Executive compensation 
 
 Sample period Sample size Relationship between 
the variable and 
corporate governance 
quality 
Significance origin remark 
Mehran(1995) 1979-1980 153 (+) Yes U.S Manufacturing firms 
Datta, Datta and 
Raman (2001) 
1993-1998 1719 (+) Yes U.S Analysis the 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns to Acquiring 
Shareholders 
 
Duality 
 
 Sample period Sample size Relationship between 
the variable and 
corporate governance 
quality 
Significance  origin remark 
Simpson and Gleason 
(1999) 
1993 287 (-) yes U.S Banking firms 
Baliga et al. (1996) 1986 to 1991 181 (-) yes U.S  
 
 
  4
Outside Blockholder 
 
 Sample period Sample size Relationship between 
the variable and 
corporate governance 
quality 
Significance origin remark 
Mehran (1995) 1979-1980 153 (+) No U.S Manufacturing firms 
Holderness and 
Sheeham (1988) 
 114 
 
 
(+) Yes U.S Analysis the stock 
performance after 
block share purchase 
Barclay and 
Holderness (1989) 
1978-1982 63 (+) Yes U.S Analysis the stock 
performance after 
block share purchase 
Singh and Davidson 
(2003) 
1992 and 1994 1528 Asset turnover: (+) 
SG&A expense: (+) 
Asset turnover: No 
SG&A expense: 
No 
U.S NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ listed large 
US corporation having 
sales revenue of 
$100M or more 
Mcconnel and Servaes 
(1990) 
1976 and 1986 1173 (yr1976) 
1093 ( yr1986) 
(+) No U.S  
 
 
 
  5
Board Composition-Fraction of outside director 
 
 Sample period Sample size Relationship between 
the variable and 
corporate governance 
quality  
Significant origin remark 
Weisbach (1988) 1977-1980 495 (+) yes U.S Use earning as 
performance measure 
Rosenstrin and Wyatt 
(1990) 
1981-1985 1251 (+) Yes U.S  
Mehran (1995) 1979-1980 153 (+) No U.S. Manufacturing firms 
North (2001) 1990-1997 342 (+) Yes U.S Analysis on 
corporate 
acquisitions( not 
restricted to hostile ) 
Singh and Davidson 
(2003) 
1992 and 1994 1528 proxies by 
(1)Asset turnover: 
(+) 
(2)SG&A expensive:  
(-) 
Asset turnover: No 
SG&A expense: 
No 
U.S NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ listed 
large US corporation 
having sales revenue 
of $100M or more 
Ozkan and Ozkan 
(2004) 
1984-1999 839 (+) No U.K Use cash holding as 
proxy of Corporate 
Governance Measure 
 
